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WHY QUEERNESS IS NOT ENOUGH : 
AGAINST MORAL ELIMINATIVISM
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Abstract : Moral error theorists often claim to be strongly anti‑metaphysical 
in their moral scepticism and atheistic naturalists. This paper argues that pre‑
cisely this becomes a problem for them, when their metaethical and ontologi‑
cal commitments clash. I first outline how the known arguments against error 
theory face a problematic, yet rarely considered trade‑off : either they are very 
strong, then they are also very demanding in their assumptions or they are less 
demanding in their assumptions but rather weak in their conclusions. In re‑
sponse to this challenge I then develop a new argument against error theory 
that exploits an overlooked inconsistency in the error theorists’ standard line 
of argumentation. I conclude that the implications of this inconsistency are less 
of a problem for fictionalist error theorists, but will render any eliminativism 
based on error theory circular.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than 30 years after J. L. Mackie introduced moral error theory as a 
metaethical view, his theory still sparks discussion1. Moral error theorists of‑
ten claim to be strongly anti‑metaphysical in their moral scepticism and athe‑
istic naturalists. This paper argues that precisely this becomes a problem for 
them, when their metaethical and ontological commitments clash. I first out‑
line how the known arguments against error theory face a problematic, yet 
rarely considered trade‑off : either they are very strong, then they are also 
very demanding in their assumptions or they are less demanding in their 
* David KRETZ, ECLA of Bard (Berlin, Germany). Contact address : d.kretz@berlin.bard.edu.
1 See, for example, Finlay (2008, 2010) ; Joyce (2011, 2012) ; Olson (2010) ; Daly & Liggins (2010) 
and different contributions in A World Without Values, ed. R. Joyce and S. Kirchin.
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assumptions but rather weak in their conclusions. In response to this chal‑
lenge I then develop a new argument against error theory that strikes a bal‑
ance between strength and frugality by exploiting an overlooked inconsisten‑
cy in the error theorists’ standard line of argumentation. I conclude that the 
implications of this inconsistency are less of a problem for fictionalist error 
theorists, but will render any eliminativism based on error theory circular.
II. MACKIE’S ERROR THEORY AND ITS CRITICS
Moral error theory claims that moral judgments (‘It is good to do X’) 
are uniformly and systematically false (Mackie, 35). It rests on two claims. 
Firstly, the conceptual claim that moral judgments entail a reference to what 
Mackie calls objective values. Objective values according to Mackie are cate‑
gorically prescriptive entities that determine the truth and falsehood of mor‑
al judgments.
What does it mean for something to be categorically prescriptive and ob‑
jective ? For Mackie, saying that something is prescriptive is to say that it 
is action‑guiding (Mackie, 23/4)2. Objective values „tell us how we ought to 
act, (…) they give us reasons for acting“ (Miller 2003, 115). To be categorical‑
ly prescriptive means that this prescriptivity does not depend on an agent’s 
particular desires (see also Kant 1997, 25‑7 & Finlay 2008, 4). It is a bit hard‑
er to determine what exactly Mackie means by objective. Miller gives an im‑
pressive list of Mackie’s usages of the term. Among other things, the term 
objective in Mackie seems to denote entities that are part of the fabric of the 
world, extra‑mental, independent of our attitudes, that can be an object of 
knowledge, and that can be perceived, to name just a few (Miller 2003, 116).
The second claim, which is often called the ontological claim, is simply 
that such objective values do not exist. Mackie then combines these claims 
and argues that all moral judgments are wrong, since a) objective values do 
not exist but b) all moral claims or judgments erroneously entail a reference 
to them. The conceptual claim makes error theory a form of cognitivism, be‑
cause it entails that moral judgments are truth‑apt, their truth depending on 
precisely those objective values whose existence is denied by the ontological 
claim. Due to the ontological claim moral error theory is usually also seen 
as a form of moral anti‑realism (Miller 1977, 112 ; Joyce 2009, 1).3 As Richard 
Joyce puts it, error theory „combines a rich view of moral concepts with a 
meager ontological view of the world“ (Joyce 2013, 6).
As Mackie himself remarks, moral error theory is strongly anti‑common‑
sensical (Mackie 1977, 35) and thus needs to be backed up by very good 
arguments. One such argument that Mackie offers is the argument from 
2 See also Walter Sinnott‑Armstrong (2010, 56‑60). 
3 Pace Jamie Dreier (2010).
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queerness, which is typically considered to involve a metaphysical and an 
epistemological strand.4
The metaphysical part of the argument is that objective values „would 
be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different 
from anything else in the universe“ (Mackie 1977, 38). He compares them 
to Platonic forms, paragons of a metaphysical entity (40). The epistemolog‑
ical argument follows this line of thought and states that „if we were aware 
of [objective values], it would have to be by some special faculty of moral 
perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of know‑
ing anything else“ (38). Both arguments work to the conclusion that there 
are no objective values.
Many arguments have been made against error theory and they broad‑
ly fall into three different categories. Yet each of these categories faces prob‑
lems. The first one includes direct or external attacks that are directed ei‑
ther against the conceptual claim or the ontological claim. The conceptual 
claim is what makes Mackie’s theory a cognitivist theory. Attacks against 
this claim are thus most readily accessible to non‑cognitivists, but there have 
been others too.5 Many arguments have been made against the ontological 
claim, and especially the metaphysical aspect of the argument from queer‑
ness is still controversial.6 The main advantage of such attacks is that they 
are usually very strong. Since error theory cannot do without either the con‑
ceptual or the ontological claim7, a successful direct attack has a considera‑
ble chance to be a decisive argument against error theory. The weakness of 
such arguments, however, is that they do not beat the error theorist on her 
own ground, but always remain an external critique. As such, they are often 
very complex and are based on other metaethical and philosophical views 
which are usually also debated. For example, the success or failure of a par‑
ticular version of the metaphysical argument from queerness depends on 
the correctness of the Humean theory of motivation (Mackie 1977, pp. 40/1 ; 
Lillehammer forthcoming, 3). Direct attacks are strong if successful, but are 
usually very demanding in their assumptions.
The second category contains arguments that do not argue against either 
claim but rather aim at Mackie’s conclusions, arguing that his theory is, if not 
false, at least unattractive, counterintuitive, too demanding, or else lacks some 
4 Even more fine‑grained distinctions can be made. Hallvard Lillehammer, for example, points 
out that there are at least three different kinds of metaphysical queerness that are in question 
(Lillehammer forthcoming, 3 ; see also Garner 1990). 
5 See, for example, the debate between Finlay (2008, 2010), Joyce (2011, 2012), and Olson (2010).
6 Lillehammer (forthcoming) gives a great overview of the debate around the argument from 
queerness. 
7 Joyce disagrees and points to the possibility that one could become an error theorist simply 
by disagreeing with all other metaethical theories but he concedes that the „the two‑step argu‑
ment is the error theorist’s standard strategy“ (2013, 5). Also, it is hard to see how a rebuttal 
of at least one of the two claims would not make another metaethical theory attractive, but let 
that go for now. 
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of the essential theoretical virtues. Accordingly, the proponents of these kinds 
of attacks argue that their respective theories are superior to error theory be‑
cause they are simpler, more elegant, honest, charitable, conservative, natu‑
ralistic, or economical, to name just a few examples8. These arguments can be 
seen as a response to the problems of direct attacks. Instead of arguing that 
error theory is wrong, they only aim to establish that error theory is unattrac‑
tive because it lacks some essential theoretical virtue. As such, they are less 
demanding than direct attacks but they are also weaker. Even if error theory 
is an unattractive, ugly truth, it could still be a truth. At the same time they 
are not entirely frugal in their assumptions and thus still force their propo‑
nents to endorse other metaethical positions which are also usually debated.
Attacks against moral error theory of the third and last category try to 
solve this problem by being aimed neither at the premises nor at the con‑
clusions but at the way the latter is derived from the former, i.e. it questions 
the argument’s validity. Aiming to exploit an irreconcilable, inner tension 
or contradiction of the error theory, they are potentially devastating, while 
also being very frugal in their demands and do not force their proponents 
to committing to any controversial metaethical view of their own. Yet it is of 
course very hard to find such irreconcilable tensions or contradictions in the 
error theory and a compelling argument of this kind has not been made yet. 
9 Following Miller, I will refer to this category of attack as an internal or in‑
direct attack against error theory (Miller 2003, 118).
In the next section of this paper I will develop an argument that is de‑
signed to combine the advantages of all three categories and simultaneously 
addresses their various problems, i.e. a strong argument against error theory 
that is also very frugal in its assumptions. It will be aimed at the error theo‑
rists arguments for the ontological claim (first category), and largely remain 
neutral about the conceptual claim. Secondly, rather than claiming that er‑
ror theory is false, it will suggest that error theory is unattractive to ontolog‑
ical naturalists (second category). Thirdly, it will offer an indirect line of at‑
tack (third category) against the argument from queerness that is accessible 
to proponents of a wide range of metaethical and philosophical positions.
III. A NEW OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT
Recall that the argument from queerness has two aspects : a metaphysical 
and an epistemological. The metaphysical argument from queerness runs as 
follows (Mackie 1977, 38‑42 ; Lillehammer forthcoming, 2/3) :
8 Daly and Liggins in their 2010 defence of error theory deal largely, though not exclusively, 
with these attacks. They concluded that all of the charges considered are either ill‑motivated, 
false, or otherwise fail to provide compelling arguments against error theory (ibid. 21).
9 A prominent objection that falls into this category is the familiar charge that error theory con‑
tradicts the Law of the Excluded Middle. The issue has been discussed among other by Olson 
(2010) and Pigden (2010, 27‑32). I agree with both that error theorists can meet this charge. 
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PM1  Objective values would be metaphysically queer, utterly different 
from anything else in the universe.
PM2  According to our naturalist worldviews we do not find such queer 
entities in the world.
CM Therefore objective values do not exist.
The first premise, which is just stating the queerness of objective values, 
can take on different forms, depending on how exactly this queerness is to 
be thought. The second premise is a commitment to a naturalist worldview.
The epistemological argument from queerness runs similarly (Mackie 
1977, 38‑42 ; Lillehammer forthcoming, 9/10) :
PE1  Objective values would be epistemologically queer, i.e. they would 
place strange demands on our epistemic faculties.
PE2  We are most likely unable to epistemically meet these strange de‑
mands.
CE  We should not believe in the existence of objective values.
There are four logically possible permutations about the soundness of 
those two arguments. Either (1) both are sound, or (2) the metaphysical ar‑
gument is sound and the epistemological argument is unsound, or (3) the 
epistemological argument is sound and the metaphysical argument is un‑
sound, or (4) both are unsound.
In case 4, objective values exist and we are able to acquire knowledge 
about them. This means that the ontological claim of error theory is defeat‑
ed and the road is open for moral realism. A direct attack on the ontologi‑
cal claim will most likely proceed by arguing for this case. However, I want 
to suggest another kind of attack that tries to exploit a tension between the 
other three cases.
Let us now look at the two cases in which the epistemological argument 
is sound, case 1 and case 3. If the epistemological argument is sound than PE2 
is true. However, this makes it undecidable for us whether the metaphysical 
argument is sound or not. PM2 states that we do not find metaphysically queer 
objective values in this world. Yet there are two possible reasons for why this 
is so : it could either be that PM2 is true because there really are none and fur‑
thermore we would be unable to epistemically detect them anyway (i.e. case 
1). Our situation would then be similar to the situation of a blind person in 
an empty, dark room. Or – the second option – it could be that there are in‑
deed objective values in the world and PM2 is false but we are just unable to 
epistemically detect them (case 3). In that case our situation would be like 
the situation of a blind person in a bright room filled with objects. In nei‑
ther case do we find objective values but the reasons for that are completely 
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different. In one case objective values just do not exist, and in the other case 
they exist but we are epistemically unable to find them.
Let us now look at the two cases (1, 2) in which the metaphysical argu‑
ment is sound. If this is the case, the epistemological argument becomes un‑
decidable: do we not find objective values because there simply are none, 
but if there were any we would easily find them (case 2) or are there none, 
but even if there were any we still could not find them (case 1). To stick with 
the analogy: in an empty, dark room, there’s no way of knowing whether 
we’re blind or just in an empty, dark room. In neither case do we find objec‑
tive values, but it becomes impossible for us to tell why.
Thus a problem arises for the error theorist who defends both the meta‑
physical and the epistemological argument. If she accepts one of the argu‑
ments, the other one becomes undecidable for her. One part of the argument 
can be seen as an argument against the other. This challenge is an indirect at‑
tack, but, not against error theory as a whole but specifically against the argu‑
ment from queerness. Since the argument from queerness is used to defend 
the ontological claim it also has elements of a direct attack on error theory, 
combining the strength of the latter with the frugality of the former. What 
are the error theorist’s options ? The obvious move to make in defence of er‑
ror theory, it seems, is to just drop one of the arguments and try to back the 
ontological claim with a reinforced version of one of the two possible argu‑
ments from queerness. But either way is problematic and thus a dilemma 
for error theory results.
The error theorist cannot just drop the epistemological argument and ar‑
gue only on the basis of the metaphysical argument. Since the epistemolog‑
ical argument renders the metaphysical one undecidable, it can always be 
used as an argument against error theory, which has to be met by the error 
theorist through a stronger version of the metaphysical argument. She would 
have to argue that objective values are not just metaphysically queer but are 
in fact impossible. If the error theorist could show that objective values can‑
not possibly exist, i.e. that they cannot exist in any possible world, then the 
metaphysical argument would always and necessarily be true and tautolog‑
ical and the epistemological uncertainty about why we do not find objective 
values in this world would be resolved. But as long as we do not have a con‑
vincing metaphysical argument for the a priori and necessary impossibili‑
ty of objective values the epistemological argument stands as a challenge to 
the error theorist. And the chances of successfully developing such an argu‑
ment, I shall argue, are slim.
What do I mean if I say that something is a priori and necessarily impos‑
sible, as opposed to merely queer ? An example may clarify the distinction. 
Saying that objective values are queer is to liken their non‑existence to the 
non‑existence of unicorns. They do not exist in this world but we can easily 
imagine a world where unicorns actually exist. To claim that objective val‑
ues are a priori and necessarily impossible, on the other hand, would mean 
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to liken their non‑existence to the non‑existence of pink, invisible unicorns. 
The notion of a pink, invisible unicorn is the notion of something a priori and 
necessarily impossible because it entails a contradiction in terms. A part of 
what it means to be pink is to be visible. Thus, in no possible world can there 
be entities that are at the same time pink and invisible, and unicorns of this 
kind are a priori and necessarily impossible.
Sophisticated error theorists like Richard Garner and Richard Joyce re‑
ject, of course, at least the first part of this comparison. Objective values are 
not merely queer the way unicorns are but they are „unusual in an unusual 
way“ as Garner puts it (Garner 1990, 143). The metaphysical argument can 
take different forms, each focusing on a different kind of queerness, and it is 
often hard to see whether the error theorists intend their arguments to show 
the contingent non‑existence or the necessary impossibility of objective val‑
ues. I will, however, not go through all the variations of the metaphysical 
argument here, because there is a more general point to be made why any 
given argument for the a priori and necessary impossibility of objective val‑
ues will not be readily available to the error theorist. Due to its conceptual 
claim error theory is a form of cognitivism, i.e. it views moral judgments as 
truth‑apt. But if objective values cannot possibly exist and moral judgments 
can be true only if objective values do exist, then moral judgments cannot 
possibly be truth‑apt. An argument that establishes the a priori and neces‑
sary impossibility of objective values will thus be too strong to be compati‑
ble with the conceptual claim of error theory. Instead of merely erroneous, 
our use of moral language would be truly paradoxical. This turn from an er‑
ror theory to a ‘paradox theory’ would be quite a radical departure from the 
entire metaethical view that error theorists are trying to establish.
With such implications looming, the second and perhaps better way of 
meeting the new challenge would be to forego the metaphysical argument 
completely and merely defend the epistemological argument : objective val‑
ues would be queer entities, and we have problems with epistemically detect‑
ing such queer entities. Thus, the error theorist could argue, there might or 
might not be objective values, but either way we cannot tell and thus should 
not believe in them. However, as we have seen, if we assume that the episte‑
mological argument holds then the metaphysical argument is rendered un‑
decidable. Thus, the naturalist’s scepticism about objective values is not well 
justified but, the question of their existence being undecidable, the error the‑
orist rather has to assume a weaker, merely agnostic position on the question 
about the existence of objective values. The strong ontological claim would 
have to be given up in favour of a weaker epistemological claim. If we can‑
not know whether objective values exist, and if knowledge about the exist‑
ence of objective values is necessary to determine the truth and falsehood 
of moral judgements, it follows that we cannot make any claims about the 
truth and falsehood of moral judgments. Error theory thus would be a form 
39
Why Queerness is not Enough : Against Moral Eliminativism
of moral agnosticism that cannot establish the falsehood or truth of any mor‑
al judgment and thus fails in its central aim.
Having to endorse agnosticism about objective values rather than a 
well‑founded scepticism would be quite a disappointment for the error the‑
orist, who, as it is sometimes put, takes a position towards morality that is 
analogous to an atheist’s position towards religion (Joyce 2011, 1 ; Joyce 2010, 
xii ; Garner 2010b). The distinction between atheism and agnosticism is a sub‑
tle but nevertheless important one, the latter being a considerably weaker 
position. In an ontologically naturalist framework, i.e. an ontological frame‑
work that denies the existence of supernatural entities (Daly & Liggins 2010, 
19 ; Miller 2003, 178‑80 ; see also Papineau 2009), the question about the ex‑
istence of objective values should be decidable, thus justifying either scep‑
ticism or realism (see also Mackie 1977, 17/8). Yet, if I am right, scepticism 
about objective values is not an option for the error theorist, who can at best 
establish agnosticism about objective values. If we cannot know whether ob‑
jective values exist, and if knowledge about the existence of objective val‑
ues is necessary to determine the truth and falsehood of moral judgements, 
it follows that we cannot make any claims about the truth and falsehood of 
moral judgments. Error theory thus would be a form of moral agnosticism. 
As such it cannot establish the falsehood or truth of any moral judgment and 
thus fails in its central aim. In pointing out a conflict between error theory 
and ontological naturalism we also find an element of the second category 
of attacks in this new argument.10
Not being able to make claims about the truth or falsehood or moral judg‑
ments might be more problematic for certain kinds of error theorists than oth‑
ers. A distinction is often drawn between eliminativists, or moral abolition‑
ists, on the one hand, and moral fictionalists on the other. Both eliminativism 
and fictionalism are forms of error theory and both agree that the positive, 
atomic propositions of our moral discourse are uniformly false. However, 
they differ in their opinion on what consequences should be drawn from this 
with regards to moral discourse. The eliminativist recommends that mor‑
al discourses should be abandoned completely „just as we have abandoned 
phlogiston‑talk“ (Daly & Liggins 2010, 2). The fictionalist, on the other hand, 
argues that we should stop believing the erroneous propositions of the mor‑
al discourse but rather choose to merely accept them, without committing 
10 Daly and Liggins in their 2010 defence of error theory consider attacks that claim an incom‑
patibility between error theory and methodological naturalism (Daly & Liggins 2010, 19‑21). 
Simply put, methodological naturalism holds that science is the best way to find out about the 
world, whereas ontological naturalism is an ontological view that denies the existence of super‑
natural entities (Daly & Liggins 2010, 19 ; Miller 2003, 178‑80 ; see also Papineau 2009). My argu‑
ment is concerned with the latter, because it claims that error theory is not well justified in de‑
nying the existence of supernatural, queer objective values, but it does not make claims about 
the former. Hence, Daly’s and Liggins’ objections do not affect my argument. 
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to their truth.11 Their debate can be seen as disagreement about the use and 
harm of moral language that is grounded in error theory. Both eliminativ‑
ism and fictionalism generally assume that error theory is correct and is a 
sound metaethical basis for their views. The argument of this paper is espe‑
cially aimed at the eliminativist strand.
Richard Garner, who champions this position, in his paper „Abolishing 
Morality“ gives us a posteriori reasons why we should abandon morality, in‑
cluding three charges against morality that Mackie considered and reject‑
ed, namely that „morality inflames dispute and makes compromise diffi‑
cult, it preserves unfair arrangements and facilitates the misuse of power, 
and it makes global war possible“ (Garner 2010, 219/220). Besides the ques‑
tion whether these claims are true or not, a posteriori reasons are unlikely to 
successfully justify abolishing morality, if the error theorist can at best be an 
agnostic about moral judgments. The reason is as follows. Abandoning our 
moral discourse threatens to put an end not only to moral discourse, but also 
to metaethical discourse. In fact, one of the hopes that motivate Garner to ar‑
gue for eliminativism is that we will finally be able to put an end to (at least 
some) metaethical disputes (Garner 2010, 220 & 222‑4). However, arguing for 
metaethical eliminativism on the basis of moral agnosticism, when in fact it 
remains yet an open question whether objective values do exist and whether 
moral judgments are sometimes true, begs the question. As was shown be‑
fore, the eliminativists are not justified in their scepticism but can only em‑
brace an agnostic position. If it is yet undecided, and maybe even undecid‑
able, whether the ontological claim is true it would be negligent to abandon 
the discourse that is aimed precisely at answering this question. Differently 
put, abandoning the metaethical discourse assumes that this discourse can‑
not help us to find out about the truth and truth‑aptness of moral judgments. 
But, as was shown, it remains an open question for the error theorist whether 
moral judgments are ever true. Thus eliminativists are begging the question 
when they abandon moral and metaethical discourse on a posteriori grounds, 
and a priori grounds do not seem to be available to them.
There may be one way out for the eliminativist. Metaethics is widely re‑
garded as a non‑empirical discipline by moral anti‑realists and realists alike. 
Even very naturalist, reductionist forms of realism might not necessarily en‑
tail a commitment to viewing the analysis of the moral qualities of an act 
or property as an empirical question (Miller 2003, 180‑2). The only possible 
way for the eliminativist is to break with this position and embrace a con‑
ception of metaethics as an empirical discipline.12 In doing so they would 
change the standards of justification that a metaethical theory needs to com‑
11 Miller makes the same distinction but calls the two forms radical and moderate error theory, 
respectively (Miller 2003, 122).
12 Joyce points to some reasons why the debate between fictionalists and eliminativists might be 
decided with reference to empirical research (Joyce 2010, xv ; 2013, 2).
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ply with. Empirical, a posteriori evidence would then be the right kind of ev‑
idence to support eliminativism in just the same way that experimental evi‑
dence in physics is the right kind of evidence to justify an error theory about 
phlogiston.
The implications of such a move are significant. Firstly, this would not 
only make a posteriori evidence the right kind of evidence but also completely 
change the problem in question. Error theory is a theory about the truth and 
truth‑aptness of moral judgments. Yet, no matter whether the eliminativists 
see themselves as moral sceptics or agnostics, they cannot, by their own stand‑
ards, hope to learn much about the truth of moral judgments from empiri‑
cal research. The only question they can hope to solve empirically is whether 
or not the use of moral language does more harm than good (in a non‑mor‑
al sense). This question is relevant for the debate between fictionalism and 
eliminativism; it is not relevant for the debate about error theory. Embracing 
a conception of metaethics as an empirical disciprand thus makes eliminativ‑
ism lose its error theoretic underpinnings: it might save eliminativism, but it is 
not a reasonable option for an error theorist. This also means that – although 
eliminativists would not have to defend error theory anymore, which has al‑
ways been tedious – their theory would not have any answer to the question 
whether moral judgments are sometimes true, which significantly reduces 
the explanatory powers and philosophical richness of their views. The po‑
tential incompatibility between error theory and eliminativism is an impor‑
tant, overlooked, and uncomfortable implication for the eliminativists, yet it 
is unavoidable if they should choose to embrace a conception of metaethics 
as an empirical discipline.
Moral fictionalism might be less affected by the argument of this paper 
because the consequences that it draws from error theory are less radical. 
Agnosticism might serve it well for its purposes. Most importantly, more‑
over, it does not beg the question the way eliminativism does through ar‑
guing for the abolition of metaethical discourse on a posteriori grounds. 
Nevertheless it might, of course, face other problems and be philosophical‑
ly unattractive for other reasons.13
Thus, there is a tension between the metaphysical and the epistemolog‑
ical strands of the argument from queerness that threatens the ontological 
claim. The error theorist cannot reinforce the metaphysical argument be‑
cause such a reinforced argument is incompatible with her commitments to 
cognitivism. The only other option for the error theorist is to rely exclusive‑
ly on the epistemological argument and embrace an agnosticism about mor‑
al judgments. This means that moral error theory cannot establish a claim 
about the truth and falsehood of moral judgments. While this might be less 
13 See, for example, Joyce 2013, 2 ; Oddie & Demetriou 2010 ; Garner 2010. 
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of a problem for the fictionalist, it will render any eliminativism based on 
moral error theory circular.14
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